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The Aesthetics of Ambiguity 
Christoph Bode 
Kiel University 
It is an unspectacular observation to say that modernist literature is difficult, that it is 
somehow more obscure, more complicated, hermetic, equivocal or ambiguous than the literature 
of former times. More than a hundred years after the first stirrings of literary modernism the 
opinio communis still seems to be that these texts are markedly «different», that it is unclear 
what they are all «about», or whether they make any sense at all. 
I should like to take this common assessment, which only looks naive but contains more truth 
than meets the eye, as my point of departure and discuss how literary theory can help us 
understand the phenomenon in question. This means that my paper wi l l not give you a whole 
range of examples of highly ambiguous modernist fiction or poetry, with which, I suppose, you 
are familiar anyhow; it is rather about ways of theoretically dealing with literary texts which 
demonstratively display semiosis, or the conspicuous proliferation of multiple meanings. It is, by 
the way, in this sense that I shall use the term ambiguity: as an umbrella term which covers all 
sorts of linguistic and literary phenomena having more than one possible interpretation or 
meaning. 
How then can we theoretically account for a literature which displays this feature to a hitherto 
unknown degree? Basically, there are two different approaches. You can either bunch together 
modern avantgard poetry and fiction with similar manifestations in 20th century painting and 
musical composition and then explain their occurrence with reference to something that is outside 
literature, outside the arts; or you can go in the opposite direction and try to specify whether 
there is anything in the logic of literary texts and literature in general that can be held accountable 
for this new kind of writing. In other words, you go inside the aesthetic material and try to 
understand how its structures work and function, and where - and possibly why - the difference 
comes in. 
At first sight, the first approach looks more promising: It could yield a very economical, 
simple explanation for a whole variety of interrelated phenomena and it would stress the fact that 
literature does not happen in the void but is essentially something cultural, social and historical. 
But when you survey the various studies committed to this approach, you begin to wonder. For 
one, their statements about some fundamental causal or dialectical relationship between modernist 
literature on the one hand and «the modernist situation* on the other hand remain, on the whole, 
suspiciously general; that is, a general interrelatedness is insinuated, but this approach tells you 
very little about concrete, individual works of modernism. Secondly, this approach invariably 
tends to be reductive, that is, something literary is reduced to something extra-literary and 
non-literary, an aesthetic phenomenon is treated as i f it were non-aesthetic etc.. No talk of 
dialectics can dispel this atmosphere of simplistic positivism, can counter the feeling that 
something essential has been lost on the way. 
My third objection is not systematical, but «merely» empirical: The majority of studies which 
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opt for the «external» explanation of modernist literature treat their object in a barely hidden 
derogative, or even downright hostile way. Whether conservative idealists deplore the «loss of 
the centre* and identify modernist art and literature as a symptom of a fast spreading cultural 
disease, or whether self-appointed Marxists - quite undialectically - denounce nodernism as 
downright «bourgeois decadence*, as an unmistakable sign of the inveterate corruption and 
imminent downfall of capitalist society, in both cases it is only too obvious that they do not like 
what they see. In a quite demagogical way, they make use of the undeniable gap between artist 
and public and censure modern art and literature for not toeing the line, for not meeting certain 
pre-established norms. Regrettably, most of their efforts must be filed under «Hcw to explain 
modernism without really trying*. 
What we need instead is an aesthetics of modernist literature which does not reduce its object, 
but opens it up, which makes it accessible and understandable, an aesthetics which does not 
denounce the new as a deficient version of the old, which can rather enlighten as about the 
working of this new kind of writing as well as about its historical locus. The questicn is not how 
can we reduce, belittle or truncate a phenomenon so that it fits our theories and preconceptions, 
but how can we widen our concepts and ideas so that they embrace what w: cannot yet 
understand. What we need, in a word, is an aesthetics at the height of its mate-ial. For this 
purpose, it seems on second thoughts, an approach which is after the evolutionär/ logic of its 
object and the concrete workings of this kind of language is much more adequate .nan a global 
«external» explanation. 
What then does poetical or literary language do? How does it differ from other kinds of 
language? Once you pose these questions, you have already - wittingly or not - subscribed to 
deviational aesthetics, i.e. an aesthetics which presupposes that poetical language deviates in 
certain respects from the norm of everyday language and that one can name its essence -
literariness - by laying one's finger upon that specific difference. It is true that deviational 
aesthetics, convincing as it is at first sight, is subject to fairly serious criticism - but this need not 
concern us here, only later. The astounding thing about 20th century models o: poetical or 
literary language based on deviational aesthetics is that practically all of them, however different 
they may be, attach highest importance to the phenomenon of ambiguity, although - and that is 
truly remarkable - none of them was originally designed to highlight or bring out the decisive 
role of ambiguity. But whether you follow the structuralist model of Roman Jakobson or the ideas 
of the Soviet semiotician Jurij Lotman or the aesthetics of the post-structuralist Roland Barthes -
and I could name a few others -, they all acknowledge that ambiguity is not peripheral but 
central to poetry and literature, that ambiguity could even be called the hallmark of poetical and 
literary language, because it is an unavoidable and necessary effect of the special kind of 
structuring that language undergoes once it is used in this particular way. 
How is that? I hope I do not injustice to the notable differences between the above-mentioned 
thinkers when I say that the fundamental idea of all deviational aesthetics is this: in poetical and 
literary language, linguistic elements are taken out of their «normal» context and reassembled in 
a new and unexpected way. The rules and patterns of everyday language are not binding for 
literary texts, which constitute their own codes. These idiosyncratic codes are, of course, not 
ready at hand for the reader - he has to find them or even constitute them by actively engaging 
in this secondary structuring of a given text in the act of reading. This activity can be arduous 
and frustrating or delightful and rewarding - it all depends. But in any case it follows that one 
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can only speak of an adequate aesthetic reading i f the reader is tackling the text on this secondary 
plane and trying to decipher what these once familiar but now strangely recontextualized elements 
mean here, what their secondary or literary meaning is, beyond their everyday referential use. 
This is exactly where ambiguity comes in: As no secondary structuring of language can totally 
obliterate the customary and deeply ingrained referential meanings of these elements but can only, 
by various devices, loosen their formal ties, these elements now characteristically oscillate 
between what they usually mean and the new meaning they are striving to constitute. Therefore, 
all poetical language is inevitably ambiguous - I should like to call this «Ambiguity Mark I» -; 
this is just another way of saying that literary or poetical texts are written in such a way that we 
are led to surmise there is a secondary plane to them, an «extra» meaning. A l l this is not new, 
yet it wi l l , in the long run, help us to understand the conspicuously high degree of ambiguity in 
modernism, help us to understand why this «Ambiguity Mark II» is so predominant in avantgarde 
literature. 
Before I go on with this, however, I have to stop and discuss a concept which figures largely 
in these very same models: it is the notion of auto-referentiality, which is a bit problematical 
but which, by its being problematical, wonderfully points the way toward an explanation of 
«Ambiguity Mark II». 
«Auto-referentiality» could be called the sister term of «ambiguity», as both describe two sides 
of the same coin. What it basically means is that when you reassemble linguistic elements in a 
strange and unusual way you force the reader to slow down his reading, you render his acts of 
recognition more difficult, while at the same time you appeal to this flexibility, imagination and 
re-creative freedom. Such texts are demanding - but can be very rewarding, too. In any case, by 
this special kind of structuring the reader's attention is shifted from the usual and habitual 
referential use of these linguistic signs - for example that «swan» refers to a large white water 
bird (the example is James Anderson Winn's and it refers, of course, to Baudelaire's Le Cygne) -
to what they might mean here, in this particular context. One might say that all poetical and 
literary texts - which are, remember, by definition ambiguous - demand the reader's special 
attention and refer him to their very own composition when he asks for their meaning. Literary 
texts are therefore auto-referential in the sense that you cannot answer what they «mean» until you 
have looked closely at how they are done, and this of course means - these are the two sides of 
the coin - that they are auto-referential in the sense that they direct the reader towards their 
essential and fundamental ambiguity. 
Were it only this that is implied by the talk of auto-referentiality, we could rest the matter 
at that. But unfortunately the term as it stands suggests a bit more and is somewhat misleading. 
To say that a sign - and certainly a literary text is a super-sign - is auto-referential is a 
contradiction in terms. I f a sign is something that refers to something else, then certainly 
something that refers only to itself cannot be a sign. To this deviationists would answer that they 
do not claim absolute auto-referentiality for literary structures but only a tendency towards auto-
referentiality, or they wil l say, like Roman Jakobson, that auto-referentiality is a function which 
combines with various other functions, such as, for example, the emotive and referential 
functions, which, however, it can never totally obliterate. And, they could add with some 
justification, any misunderstanding of their use of the term was impossible, for did they not speak 
of the literary text's characteristic oscillation between.its «aesthetic» meaning and the original 
referential meaning of its elements, which could never be totally left behind? Isn't that, they 
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would argue, another way of saying that auto-referentiality in literary texts is always limited and 
never pure and absolute? It certainly is, but the consequence should be spelt out as radically as 
possible: In literature, total auto-referentiality is unattainable because its material - language -
makes it impossible. No matter what you do to a linguistic element such as «swan», no matter 
how astoundingly you re-contextualize it, its occurrence wi l l always, however faintly and 
modified, conjure up the image of a large white water bird. Not even the most extreme secondary 
structuring of language can k i l l the primary meanings. Even the breaking up of language into 
purportedly meaningless syllables or even rudimentary sounds still leaves you with a trace of 
meaning, which opens up a space for association. There is no escape from the prison-house of 
language. The medium prohibits it. The writer's material is «always already* used and no word 
chemistry enables him to neutralize it, to melt these oft-used coins into meaningless primal matter 
before he begins his proper work (the metaphor is Sigurd Burckhardt's). Language displays a 
characteristic obstinacy - the literary text is therefore always a palimpsest, it cannot help it: it 
is always written over or against the primary meaning of its elements. 
So let us accept this explanation that when deviationists speak of auto-referential texts they 
do not «reaily» mean auto-referential but only «sort of* auto-referential, as this inhibited kind of 
auto-referentiality is, «of course*, the only kind attainable in the medium of language. 
But what about the media of the other arts, music and painting? Do they too, by the nature 
of their material, prohibit pure auto-referentiality? Obviously they do not. A musical note is a 
musical note, by itself it means nothing. What it means in a musical context is dependent on its 
place and function in that musical structure. The same holds true for abstract form and colour 
(although some cognitive physiologists may have reservations). By themselves, forms and colours 
do not mean a thing - and what they mean in assembly is the product of their composition. Does 
that mean that after all there is such a thing as unqualified auto-referentiality, only not in the 
field of language? Does that mean that the original concept makes sense, only not in literary 
theory? The answer is no, for the fundamental objection has not been refuted at all: an auto-
referential sign is a contradiction in terms. We are in a pretty awkward situation: on the one hand 
it seems to make sense to characterize musical compositions and modernist non-objective 
paintings as «auto-referential»; we know what we mean by that and think it designates an 
important feature of these aesthetic constructs - but on the other hand we have to admit that the 
term, on closer inspection, is most unfortunate. 
What sort of thing is a sign which refers to itself? I propose to solve this riddle in the 
following way: A sign which leaves behind referentiality ceases to be a sign - it no longer means 
but just is. It has transcended its former being-a-sign, it has undergone a category 
transformation. It is because of this that so many people are puzzled, irritated or even infuriated 
when they are confronted with these still provocative aesthetic phenomena, such as non-
representational paintings or musical compositions which do not aim at depicting or evoking 
anything definite. People wi l l ask the artist, «What does it mean?*, and the artist's answer, «You 
look at it», is, of course, the only possible and the only correct answer. 
But what shall we call a sign which is no longer a sign, which stands for itself only? We shall 
call it, I think, quite simply what it is: a thing or an event - and as it is usually presented to us 
in an institutionalized context which society has especially set apart from ^practical* goings-on, 
we might as well call it a unique offer, an offer to experience something unusual. I find 
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something very reconciliatory and uplifting in the idea that at the end of modernism's long march 
towards auto-referentiality we are, in the most advanced manifestations of 20th century art, 
referred back to one of the most basic and ancient concepts of aesthetics, the, as I would say, 
pragma-aesthetic category kat exochen, viz. experience. This idea wi l l in the end help us to 
situate an aesthetics which strives to be at the height of its material. 
The foregoing discussion of auto-referentiality in literature and the arts wi l l pretty soon put 
us in a position to satisfactorily account for the conspicuously high degree of ambiguity in 
modernist literature, or, «Ambiguity Mark II». In fact, the explanation is already beginning to 
shine through... 
As I said before, the literary text - or more precisely: the reader's understanding of a literary 
text - characteristically oscillates between the primary referential meaning of its elements and the 
new literary (or symbolical or aesthetic) meaning they constitute. This oscillation is an inevitable 
effect of the properties of the material literature works with, viz. language. One could say that 
the massive system of everyday language exerts a kind of gravitational pull which ensures that 
none of its elements, however accelerated, can leave its space of meaning and lead a life all of 
its own. The primary referential meaning of linguistic elements makes itself felt as a force of 
inertia, always slowing down dynamic semiotic processes, inhibiting new configurations of sense, 
finally ruling out absolute meaning and autonomy. The prison-house of language needs no 
gaolers, because there is no outside, no beyond. A l l you can do as a liberty-loving inmate is to 
work inside and transform its rigidity from within, by letting loose new, unheard-of messages (or 
vice versa, because new kinds of messages produce, of course, their own codes) - messages 
which, simply because they could not be uttered in the ruling code, radically undermine its claim 
to absolute rule. 
What then can a writer do who aims at making the most of his material, who wants to bring 
out the literary in literature, the poetical in poetry? What can he do to counter the gravitational 
pull of conventional, everyday meaning, to loosen the elements from their settings and set them 
loose? Under which circumstances can he most easily set semiosis going, prepare the way for the 
dynamical production of new meanings, and, against all odds, at least reach out for auto-
referentiality, the promising yet unattainable ideal, denied to word-smiths? And what wi l l be the 
effect, the result of all his exertion? 
Well, to begin with, the breaking of ail primary codes is essential. And that includes not only 
basic codes like the semantic, syntactic and sometimes even the phonological codes, but also sets 
of rules of understanding which apply to larger units of a text and produce, when working, 
conceptions of «character», «time», «place», «plot», «causality», «coherence» etc.. A l l these 
Conventions are in fact semiosis-restricting devices which play a vital role in all kinds of literature 
which are in the widest sense mimetic, most notably, of course, in realistic and naturalistic 
writing. As I have amply illustrated elsewhere the prehistory of modernism is basically little more 
than the gradual erosion of textual codes which make the reader believe the text but mirrors life -
sometimes distortingly; always from a certain angle or perspective and always giving a certain 
section only - but nonetheless mirrors it. To the same degree that these codes or conventions are 
eroded and undermined, the linguistic elements from top to bottom, according to the specific 
point of attack, will gain a relative freedom. The reader of such an unconventional text will soon 
find out that he will not get very far when he tries to process these signs in the habitual way and, 
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i f he does not give up prematurely, he wi l l make new «informed guesses* and try out new code.' 
and sense configurations. 
Now the interesting thing is not (although it is true) that the more you take back all sorts ο 
semiosis-restricting devices and conventions, the more the text wi l l be read as a text and tru 
emphasis wil l fall increasingly on the way it is done and on its inherent processes of meaning -
that is already the basic law for «Ambiguity Mark I» (which we find in ail literature). No, after 
a certain point, something entirely new happens: the liberated signifiers become multiply 
interpretable. Their free play does not allow just one reading, it cries out for multiple decoding. 
This is the point of semiotic take-off. The accumulation of subversive-creative energy has so 
heated up the linguistic atoms that a new quality is achieved. Not more of the same, but a new 
kind of game. As the text leaves behind the shackles of mimesis, it becomes possible to lay 
various interpretive grids over the loosened elements, and i f a text is aesthetically good, i.e. 
meaning-productive, it wi l l produce whole strings of differing meaningful configurations which 
do not rule each other out but which complement each other and all together constitute the 
richness of that literary text. The text has thus turned into a meaning-generator, which feeds on 
the energy you as a reader are willing to invest. 
To answer my last question: What you get as the effect of the author's efforts to achieve auto-
referentiality in the medium of language is an augmented, an enhanced kind of ambiguity which 
clearly differs from and surpasses that ambiguity which is common to all literary texts: what you 
get is, in fact, irreducible «Ambiguity Mark II», the hallmark of modernist literature. 
I think it has now become obvious that modernism's radical departure from conventionality, 
its marked tendency towards auto-referentiality and its conspicuously high degree of irreducible 
ambiguity are only three different aspects of the very same process. No one of these could be 
without the other two, because thy are genetically inseparable. 
But isn't all this merely a theoretical construct, which has no counterpart in historical reality? 
I do not think it is and the simple proof lies in the differences between poetry and prose, which 
up ti l l now I have neglected in favour of their common features. Poetry characteristically lacked 
some of the semiosis-restricting conventions of narrative prose and where it shared them their 
application had always been more liberal, less binding. On the other hand, poetry has traditionally 
highlighted its «otherness» by the massive employment of devices like rhyme, rhythm, metaphor, 
metonymy etc.. As a result, people have always recognized its artificiality more easily than that 
of prose and they have more willingly conceded that it contains more than meets the eye, that it 
is somehow more difficult than prose etc.. I f the two - poetry and prose - had to run a race 
towards auto-referentiality, which of the two do you think would get to «Ambiguity Mark II» 
first? Literary history gives us the answer and it quite pleasingly is the same one would predict 
theoretically: poetry, of course. The advent of modernism is heralded in Mallarmd and Rimbaud, 
not in Zola! In poetry there were fewer semiosis-restricting conventions to overcome than in 
prose, or to put it the other way round: the resistance to the liberation of the signifier was much 
stronger in prose, as there the parameters orientating the reader towards mimesis and «reality» 
were traditionally much deeper anchored. It took a comparatively long time until the solvent had 
trickled down, or, i f I may mix my metaphors, until the bars to semiosis had been removed. 
Historically, prose entered the race with a handicap; poetry, it is a fact, arrived there earlier, for 
the conventions of its genre offered less resistance to the tendency towards auto-referentiality. 
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It is time, I think, to draw the first conclusions: As I have elaborated in a voluminous study 
published earlier this year [1988], it is indeed possible to describe the Euro-American history of 
painting and musical composition in the last one hundred and fifty years as a process of 
continuous and accelerating self-focalization of aesthetic structures. Both in painting and music, 
mimetic aesthetics and mimetic practice were systematically supplanted by their post-mimetic 
counterparts. Colours, forms and musical notes are materials with which auto-referentiality, i f 
the term be used at all, can be attained - language is not. I f the material of literature - words -
is exposed to the same overall tendency towards auto-referentiality, i f writers partake in the same 
revolution against mimesis - because its once liberating conventions have meanwhile become 
constricting and confining -, all you get and all you can get in this medium is a markedly higher 
degree of ambiguity, the kind of irreducible ambiguity we have come to associate with 
modernism. 
The central thesis of this paper and of the study of the same title therefore is: 
The conspicuous high degree of ambiguity in modernist literature can be identified as an 
unavoidable spin-off effect of α superordinale tendency or evolution towards higher auto-
referentiality discernible in all arts - an effect that Is, however, characteristic of literature, 
due to the specific properties of its «always already* meaningful material, language. 
It follows from this that modernist ambiguity is fundamentally different from the ambiguity 
in the literature of former times, different both in genesis and function, and, above all, in 
significance. This theoretical assessment is borne out by a diachronical survey and reconstruction 
of the literary practice and aesthetic theories predominant in bygone epochs of European writing. 
Ambiguity has always played its part in the aesthetic activation of the reader, but it is only in our 
age that it has moved right to the core and become, in its increased form, a principal, irreducible 
feature of literature. 
The above thesis presupposes, of course, that it makes sense to speak of literary history or 
the histories of music and art as evolutionary processes. This is indeed an idea that I should like 
to subscribe to. It is the only alternative to believing that what we are dealing with - the 
succession of literary texts our cultural hemisphere has produced in the last 2800 years or so -
is a meaningless jumble, a kaleidoscopic chaos without rhyme or reason. Any attempt at writing 
literary history, any sketch of how forms, structures and contents have followed each other 
imposes a certain order and logic upon its material, or i f you think the wording is too strong, it 
tells you a story. And that is a good thing. After all, it is our job - is it not? - to make 
understandable what before could not be understood, to create order and simplicity where at first 
we saw only a heterogeneous mass of disconnected phenomena. Surely, something must have 
gone wrong if, when our work is done, incomprehension and confusion have increased (although 
there are times, I must admit, when I think it is necessary to plead for the opposite . . . ) . 
When I speak of literature as an evolutionary process, I do not imply the teleological 
unfolding of a preconceived Platonic idea of literature writ large, not even that such an evolution 
is the case. A l l I am saying is that it makes sense to look at literary history as if it were an 
evolution. My approach is pragmatic and nominalist, not essentialist. And the reason why I claim 
that it makes good sense to operate with the notion of an evolutionary process is that only then 
are we in a position to answer the most important question that can be asked about change and 
innovation: Why is the new there? What is the gain, the evolutionary advantage of a 
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manifestation which is not only different in degree, but different in kind? This is why we cannot 
do with evolutionary models of the merely reproductive kind of the Russians Formalists, 
Tynjanov for example. They explain new variations of the same game, but not the introduction 
of an entirely new game. What we need is a real evolutionary model which pays tribute to the 
essential aspect of self-transcendence, i.e. the ability of a given structure to evolve all on its own 
or in co-evolution with other open systems into something quite different and original. I have 
suggested such a model in accordance with the ideas of Nobel prize winner Ilya Prigogine and 
Erich Jantsch. Time forbids me to go into details here, but the gist of the matter is this: Suppose 
literature is an evolutionary process with the fundamental rule to assemble linguistic elements in 
such a way that they can be understood as carriers of or triggers for aesthetic ideas (an aesthetic 
idea, so the classical definition of Kant, is an idea which gives you a lot to think, without, 
however, any definite thought, i.e. concept or Begriff, that could be adequate to it). Suppose 
further it is the dynamical principle of that process to take - as any self-transcending evolutionary 
process wil l do - any existing aesthetic configuration as the point of departure for a search after 
new, yet unknown and unexploited possibilities of structuring, then it is possible to deduce the 
traditional literary epochs as evolutionary plateaus at the ends of which, each time, the 
fundamental rule of the game is transcended and a new space for a «freer» play is opened up, 
because, although the old rule is not aesthetically exhausted, it has already used up all its 
innovative drive and possibilities. (This, by the way, explains both why older literary texts are 
still pleasing to us - a fact which cannot be explained by a strictly Formalist model - and why the 
speed of this evolutionary process is so much higher than could be expected i f it were only 
dependent on the feedback of the public.) So the symbolical writing of the Middle Ages gives 
way to all kind of mimetic writing (which brings greater freedom in subject matter and form), 
which in turn gives way to post-mimetic writing, a kind of writing that is as revolutionary and 
incomprehensible to the mimetically orientated reader as purely realistic and secular writing must 
have appeared to somebody reared on the traditional Christian fourfold interpretation of the 
meaning of the Scripture. 
Modernist writing constitutes a new paradigm, it is set on the catalysis or proliferation of 
possibilities of meaning. We impoverish its message when we decline to meet it on its own 
ground. Nothing is more ridiculous than summaries of the contents of say, Samuel Beckett's 
novels or Finnegans Wake. It is almost like an art criticism which describes the objects 
purportedly hidden in an abstract painting - painfully inadequate. It misses what this kind of 
literature is all about. It is not paraphrasable, no more so than any good old poem. But it can 
be experienced, and its logic can be explained, i f understood. 
Leaving behind mimesis, literary language comes into its own. In a newly won freedom it 
thematizes its own relational and symbolical condition. Literary language in its most advanced 
form is a discourse about the processes and possibilities of meaning inherent in all language. 
Literary language in this form is therefore a rehabilitation of semiosis, the dynamic principle of 
all language, too easily forgotten in the gravitational field of the hardened signifiers of everyday 
usage. The literature of modernism foregrounds what is basic to all language, viz. to signify 
through dynamic relations. Modernist literature is language in the making. 
What then are the practical consequences of an aesthetics of ambiguity which claims to be at 
the height of its material, which claims to have discovered the historical locus of modernist 
ambiguity through the logic of its coming-to-be and which pleads for a change of paradigm in 
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literary criticism in order to do justice to the change of paradigm which has occurred in literary 
practice? Paradigmatic changes seldom present new data or exciting new findings. They add little 
new to what is already there, but rather suggest looking at it in a different way. Paradigmatic 
changes suggest a different Gestalt for groupings of phenomena which have become 
problematical, and they rely on the experience of spontaneous cognitive re-grouping which, 
indeed, constitutes its own evidence. 
A major consequence of a theoretical breakthrough for the aesthetics of ambiguity would be, 
I think, that it could put an end to the futile and fruitless reiteration that there is ambiguity in 
modernist literature. That is trite and has not led us anywhere. The aesthetics of ambiguity 
instead sets out to analyze meticulously the specific HOW of «Ambiguity Mark II», and it does 
so against the backdrop of a notion of its aesthetic and historical place. Offering a model of the 
inner workings of these texts as well as of their historical logic, it conforms ideally with 
Ockham's razor («entities must not be unnecessarily multiplied*): With a very small set of 
concepts it can account satisfactorily for a wide range of interrelated and even divergent 
phenomena, such as the seemingly entirely disparate writings of Joyce on the one hand and 
Beckett on the other. It does so not only with a high degree of simplicity and economy and - i f 
I may say so - some elegance, but also with terms that do not carry with them the stigma of lack, 
the stigma of incompleteness. Why speak of «indeterminacy» when the elements of Ulysses and 
Finnegans Wake are clearly overdetermined? Why speak of gaps when what we read are clearly 
positive signs, only signs that behave in a very special way? Terminology can be revealing and 
what it reveals here in morphemes like «un-» and «leer», is that unwittingly Iser's point of 
reference is still an aesthetics of representation, of mimesis. 
But the foremost consequence would be, I think, in the way we relate to this kind of literature 
and in the way we communicate about it. Let me explain by going back and picking up two 
remarks I made earlier on. The first is that fairly serious criticism can be levelled against 
deviational aesthetics. Upon closer scrutiny it becomes evident that deviation is neither a 
sufficient nor even a necessary condition of literariness. There are literary texts which do not 
deviate at all and others which deviate a lot but are a far cry from being regarded as literary. But 
if the reasons for a text's being counted as literary do not lie within that text, they must lie 
without it. Obviously, literariness is a pragmatic category, it refers to a specific cultural 
practice, to the special way in which we process certain texts, which, prior to being processed 
in that way, did not share a common feature. Literariness in a text is, in a word, the product of 
our reading it in such a way, it is not, contrary to appearances and common belief, our point of 
departure. 
Now, doesn't that finish off the aesthetics of ambiguity, based as it is on a deviational concept 
of literary and poetic language? It might look as i f I were committing an act of critical harakiri -
but I am not. I am only positioning my theory. For it is perfectly possible to overcome the 
aporias of deviational aesthetics and yet retain its formidable explanatory power. This can be done 
by a kind of focus aesthetics, which combines (and finally replaces) both aesthetic attitude 
aesthetics and institutional aesthetics in so far as it acknowledges that our focussing on an object 
or text as aesthetic or literary constitutes the aesthetic object or literary text, as distinct from the 
material artefact (Mukarovsk^). Such an act of focussing or ascription of literariness needs no 
justification, our attitude and assessment alone are sufficient. But in reality people do not run 
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amuck aesthetically and declare their preferences in a totally subjective, idiosyncratic and 
haphazard way. Rather, they conform to and are themselves part of an established social practice. 
That is why the more individually orientated aesthetic attitude aesthetics and the more socially 
orientated institutional aesthetics are far from being at odds with each other. They rather 
complement each other in a way which is only hidden to the more fanatical proponents and 
partisans of both philosophies. What is more, there is no inherent necessity why such a unified 
focus theory of aesthetics should not include the vast range of aesthetic phenomena which are 
(at a given time, in a given society) regarded as deviating from some norm or other (such as 
practically all texts of high modernism) - as long as we keep in mind that such a deviation is only 
relative and relational and by no means constitutive of art and literature as such. As long as we 
steer clear of substantialism, there is no harm in making use of deviational aesthetics in this 
qualified sense and therefore the aesthetics of ambiguity outlined above can stand as it is. It is 
even confirmed and reinvigorated by this little detour: For if you cannot prove that a given text 
is literary, but can only point to common practice (which may be accepted or not), it follows that 
it is all the more so impossible to prove ambiguity or enumerate conclusively the meanings of 
a modernist text. All one can do - and that is a lot - is to invite readers to enter into a special 
relation with the text, to persuade them to process it in a special way and then see what happens. 
In other words: A unified focus aesthetics, which incorporates the aesthetics of ambiguity as the 
special literary case of the aesthetics of the auto-referentiality predominant in modernism, leads 
directly to a practice of mild persuasion, of opening up of possibilities of experience. Not 
pretending to know what is the case and forgoing the privilege of instructing others what to think, 
the aesthetics of ambiguity rather offers access to «meaning as an event* (Stanley Fish), to the 
experience of experience. Not claiming to be able to prove that aesthetic features are objectively 
there, the aesthetics of ambiguity, in a wise agnosticism, can calmly rely on the self-evidential 
and persuasive power of experience, of that which constitutes its own (if not logical) proof. 
This is, I think, the major consequenceof my theory. And it coincides miraculously with that 
other point I made earlier on, about auto-referential signs: An «auto-referential sign», I said, to 
the same degree that it can attain that status at all, ceases to be a sign: it no longer means, but 
is. It has transcended its being-a-sign and is «only» a thing or an event. Singled out by social and 
cultural practice, it might as well be called a unique offer, an offer to experience something new 
and unusual. At the beginning of this paper I called for an aesthetics at the height of its material 
and I suggested to widen our concepts and ideas so that they embrace and do justice to what we 
cannot yet understand. I cannot hope to have achieved this in so short a paper, and even my 
major study of the same title leaves some questions open. But if there is one point which makes 
me believe that the project is on the right track, it is this unexpected coincidence, which bears, 
I think, repetition: An art and a literature which, by striving after auto-referentiality, transcend 
their former semiotic status and present themselves as free offers of experience meet with an 
aesthetics which, knowing it can never prove conclusively the objectivity of what it talks about, 
can only submit the same offer: to enter, to expose oneself to an experience and to see what 
happens. Both modernist practice and this theory naturally coincide in the ultimate pragma-
aesthetic category: experience. 
This, them, is what modernism is all about: This kind of art and literature does not prescribe -
it leaves its meaning to us. As language comes into its own, it celebrates a playful freedom. To 
enjoy it, we nnust bring with us open-mindedness and tolerance, flexibility and keen observation, 
intelligence ma an alert curiosity, plus the ability to think on several levels at the same time or 
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to pursue several traces simultaneously. These are abilities which, in everyday life, are of no 
mean value. But here, we are invited to practice them free from any situational constraints, and 
the more we do so, the higher will be the yield. The more we bring with us and the ore we are 
willing to put at risk, the more we shall be given in return. It is a costly gift, demanding an 
exertion, designed as it is - to quote Samuel Taylor Coleridge out of context - to «mould our 
spirit, and by giving make it ask.» («Frost at Midnight*). 
It was your countryman, Jos£ Ortega y Gasset, who propounded in his writings the idea that 
human consciousness is like a net in whose meshes the elements of reality are caught. And he 
further suggested it was our task to braid the meshes of this net tighter in order to gain a richer 
catch. Variating his simile he said that many things escape our notice simply because there are 
not enough layers or levels in our minds for them to settle on and therefore it* A T ' ecessary to 
multiply these levels in our consciousness so that a greater number of elements (and 
configurations!) could find room in it simultaneously. I think that is what modernist literature is 
after, the full orchestration of human consciousness. 
And it contains, as exaction and promise, the permanent and reverberating question of the 
conditions of its social realization. Modernist literature not only thematizes semiosis and the 
proliferation of meanings, but also, conversely, their suppression and the power to define a 
uniform hegemonic discourse. In Through the Looking-GIass Alice asks, «The question is (...) 
whether you can make words mean so many things*, to which Humpty Dumpty replies, «The 
question is (...) which is to be master - that's all.» 
It is a credit to modernism that by celebrating ambiguity, creativity, and the multiple 
decodability of texts, it is never silent about its opposite: the deadening containment of language 
and meaning, which is a powerful tool of oppression. For, are not the limits of my language the 
limits of my world (Wittgenstein)? 
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